China's deepening footprint in Bangladesh — funding the Teesta river management project and expanding Mongla Port — is not mere development aid, according to former Ambassador Veena Sikri. It is a strategic encirclement manoeuvre that places Chinese dual-use infrastructure within striking distance of India's narrow Siliguri Corridor, the sole land link to its northeast, raising alarm bells across India's security establishment.

Look at the map. Not the contested LAC where tanks face off in Ladakh, not the Arunachal ridgelines where soldiers exchange hard stares across unmarked passes. Look south. Look at the soft green delta where the Teesta River drains into Bangladesh, and then trace your finger 60 kilometres northwest. There it is — the Siliguri Corridor, a sliver of Indian territory barely 22 kilometres wide at its narrowest, the only land bridge connecting mainland India to its seven northeastern states and 50 million citizens. Now imagine Chinese-built infrastructure on both sides of that sliver. That is not a hypothetical. According to former Indian Ambassador Veena Sikri, it is already underway.

In a sharp interview reported by Navbharat Times, Sikri — a former High Commissioner to Bangladesh who has spent decades parsing South Asian geopolitics — did not mince words. China's entry into Bangladesh's long-stalled Teesta River management project and its aggressive expansion of Mongla Port, she said, constitutes a direct interference in India's strategic backyard. The phrase she used was unambiguous: khatre ki ghanti — alarm bells.

The Teesta Promise India Broke — and China Picked Up

The backstory is essential, and it is embarrassing for New Delhi. India had promised Bangladesh a comprehensive Teesta water-sharing agreement for over a decade. The deal was almost signed in 2011 when then-Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited Dhaka, only for West Bengal Chief Minister IHG Banerjee to pull the plug at the last moment, citing her state's water needs. Year after year, the agreement remained tantalisingly close and perpetually deferred — a diplomatic wound that festered in Dhaka's corridors and gave every Bangladeshi government a grievance to nurse.

China walked into that wound with a chequebook. Beijing offered to finance and execute a massive Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project — not a water-sharing pact, but an infrastructure project involving embankments, dredging, and river management across the Teesta basin inside Bangladesh. For Dhaka, it was pragmatic: if India would not share the water, China would at least help manage what arrived. For Beijing, it was something else entirely — a foothold in the hydrological lifeline of a region that flanks India's most vulnerable artery.

As Sikri noted in her assessment reported by Navbharat Times, the Teesta project is not merely about water engineering. Any large-scale Chinese infrastructure project in northern Bangladesh places Chinese personnel, Chinese technology, and Chinese strategic interests within direct geographical proximity of the Siliguri Corridor. The dual-use potential — civilian infrastructure that generates military-grade intelligence about terrain, hydrology, and logistics routes — is the unspoken subtext that India's security planners cannot afford to ignore.

Mongla Port: The Southern Jaw of a Pincer

If the Teesta project is the northern arm of a strategic pincer, Mongla Port is the southern jaw. Located in the Sundarbans region of southwestern Bangladesh, Mongla is the country's second-largest seaport and sits on the Pashur River with access to the Bay of Bengal. It is roughly 350 kilometres south of the Siliguri Corridor — close enough to matter in a regional military calculus, far enough to appear innocuous to a casual observer.

China's interest in Mongla is not new, but its intensity has deepened. Beijing has been involved in port modernisation, dredging, and infrastructure development that would allow Mongla to handle significantly larger vessels. Sikri's warning, as reported, draws a straight line from Mongla to the 'string of pearls' — China's well-documented strategy of building or upgrading port facilities across the Indian Ocean rim, from Gwadar in Pakistan to Hambantota in Sri Lanka to Kyaukpyu in Myanmar. Mongla, she argues, fits the pattern precisely: a commercial facility with unmistakable dual-use capability, positioned to give China a strategic toehold on India's eastern flank.

The geography is devastating in its simplicity. Draw a triangle: the Teesta basin in northern Bangladesh, Mongla Port in the south, and the Siliguri Corridor in between. Chinese presence at two vertices of that triangle — with the Chicken's Neck at the third — creates a surveillance and logistics architecture that could, in a crisis scenario, complicate India's ability to reinforce its northeast through its sole land corridor.

Political Pulse

What the official talking points will not tell you, but what is being discussed with increasing urgency in South Block and the defence establishment, is this: India's Bangladesh problem is no longer just about illegal immigration, the Padma River, or the treatment of Hindu minorities. It is now a China problem wearing a Bangladesh mask.

The chatter among strategic affairs circles in New Delhi — the kind of talk that surfaces at Track-II dialogues and retired-diplomat WhatsApp groups — is that India fundamentally misread the post-Hasina transition. The assumption in 2024 was that any government in Dhaka, however it came to power, would eventually settle into the gravitational pull of Indian geography. That assumption is being tested. Bangladesh's interim dispensation has shown a willingness to diversify partnerships with a speed that has caught South Block off-guard, and Beijing has been the primary beneficiary.

The whisper in strategic corridors, as India Herald's read of the situation suggests, is that the real calculation in Beijing is not about Bangladesh at all. It is about leverage. Every Chinese-built bridge, port crane, and river embankment in Bangladesh is a chip on the negotiating table the next time India and China sit across from each other on the LAC — or in the UN Security Council, or at a BRICS summit. The message is quiet but clear: we are in your neighbourhood, and we are building things that do not go away.

The 22-Kilometre Vulnerability India Cannot Engineer Away

The Siliguri Corridor — colloquially the Chicken's Neck — is arguably the most discussed strategic vulnerability in Indian military literature and the least addressed in Indian infrastructure policy. At its narrowest, it is approximately 22 kilometres wide, squeezed between Nepal to the north, Bangladesh to the south, and Bhutan to the east. Every soldier, every fuel tanker, every grain shipment headed to Assam, Meghalaya, Manipur, Mizoram, Nagaland, Tripura, or Arunachal Pradesh passes through this corridor.

India has attempted to mitigate the risk: the Bogibeel Bridge over the Brahmaputra, improved airfields in the northeast, enhanced railway connectivity. But no amount of infrastructure inside India changes the fundamental geometric problem. If a hostile or China-aligned presence establishes itself on the Bangladeshi side of the corridor — through ports, river projects, surveillance infrastructure, or simply through the strategic influence that comes with being a country's largest infrastructure partner — the calculus shifts. India does not need to be militarily attacked at Siliguri to be strategically constrained there; it merely needs to be made to feel the cost of ignoring the encirclement.

This, in India Herald's assessment, is the forward dimension that Sikri's warning points toward. The danger is not a dramatic military strike on the Chicken's Neck — that scenario belongs in war-gaming exercises, not in realistic threat assessment. The danger is a slow accretion of Chinese presence around the corridor that changes the balance of leverage in every bilateral conversation India has with both Bangladesh and China. A China that can credibly threaten to complicate India's northeast connectivity — even without firing a shot — is a China with a permanent thumb on the scale.

What India Must Watch Next

Three markers will tell the story in the months ahead. First, the pace and scale of Chinese personnel deployment on the Teesta project — engineers today, but what tomorrow? Second, any moves toward a defence or naval cooperation agreement between Dhaka and Beijing that could formalise dual-use access at Mongla. Third — and this is the signal that should trigger the loudest alarm — any Chinese interest in Cox's Bazar or Chittagong, which would complete the southern arc and give Beijing a continuous strategic presence from the Bay of Bengal to the foothills of the Himalayas.

Sikri's warning, as reported by Navbharat Times, is not a prediction of war. It is a demand for strategic attention — a plea that India stop treating Bangladesh as a solved problem and start treating it as an active theatre of great-power competition. The Teesta water India would not share is now the Teesta infrastructure China is building. The Mongla Port India overlooked is now the Mongla Port China is expanding.

The question New Delhi must answer — and the question it has been avoiding for a decade — is this: when the dragon builds a nest 60 kilometres from your most vulnerable artery, do you keep watching the mountains, or do you finally look at the river?

Key Takeaways

• China has stepped into India's failed Teesta water-sharing commitment by funding a comprehensive river management project in northern Bangladesh, placing Chinese infrastructure and personnel near the Siliguri Corridor, as flagged by former Ambassador Veena Sikri.
• Mongla Port expansion fits China's 'string of pearls' strategy — a dual-use facility on the Bay of Bengal that completes the southern arm of a potential strategic pincer around India's Chicken's Neck.
• The Siliguri Corridor, at 22 km wide, is India's sole land bridge to 50 million citizens in seven northeastern states — and Chinese presence on both its northern and southern flanks fundamentally alters the balance of regional leverage.
• India's strategic miscalculation was treating post-Hasina Bangladesh as geographically captive; Dhaka's rapid diversification toward Beijing has outpaced South Block's assumptions.
• The forward risk is not a military strike on the corridor but a slow accretion of Chinese strategic presence that gives Beijing a permanent bargaining chip in every India-China negotiation.

Frequently Asked Questions

Why is the Siliguri Corridor called the Chicken's Neck?

The Siliguri Corridor is called the Chicken's Neck because of its extremely narrow shape — approximately 22 km wide at its thinnest — connecting the Indian mainland to the seven northeastern states, resembling the thin neck of a chicken on the map.

What is the Teesta River project China is funding in Bangladesh?

China has offered to finance and execute a Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project in Bangladesh, involving embankments, dredging, and river basin management — stepping in after India failed to deliver a long-promised water-sharing agreement.

How does Mongla Port fit into China's string of pearls strategy?

Mongla Port in southwestern Bangladesh is being modernised with Chinese involvement, adding to Beijing's chain of Indian Ocean port facilities — from Gwadar (Pakistan) to Hambantota (Sri Lanka) to Kyaukpyu (Myanmar) — that give China strategic maritime access around India.

Is India's northeast militarily vulnerable because of the Siliguri Corridor?

Yes. The Siliguri Corridor is India's only land route to its northeast. Any hostile presence or strategic encirclement around it — through infrastructure, surveillance, or diplomatic leverage — could complicate India's ability to reinforce or supply its northeastern states, home to roughly 50 million people.